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1. Introduction
Unemployment in Hungary and Poland has risen dramatically since late 1989 when
the process of privatization and economic reform began to accelerate. To ease the hardship
associated with worker dislocation and to maintain social stability, the governments of these
countries acted quickly to institute unemployment compensation and a variety of active labor
programs. The active labor programs adopted include nearly the full menu existing in
nations with developed market economies: retraining, public service employment, wage
subsidies, self-employment assistance, job creation investments, work sharing, early
retirement subsidies, and the employment exchange.
This paper compares employment policies in Hungary and Poland and overviews the
systems being implemented for monitoring the performance of these programs. The
management systems being introduced for labor market programs in Hungary and Poland are
examples of performance driven government. They are idealized versions of systems like
those called for by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 passed by the
103rd United States Congress. 1 In both Hungary and Poland, performance indicators have
been specified to measure the success of each labor market program. This information will
provide an important basis for program management and planning. A performance
measurement system has been functioning in Hungary since the begining of 1994.
Nationwide training in methods for performance management will be conducted in Poland in
November 1995.
The performance indicators systems were designed to promote decentralized decision
making while still allowing monitoring of program effectiveness by federal employment
program managers. The systems being implemented allow a standardized assessment of
program performance both across administrative districts and across programs. Measures of
performance were carefully selected so as to minimize adverse incentives. The systems are
intended to promote superior performance through positive incentives, and to help identify
and correct poor performance through technical assistance and/or sanctions.
An important distinction of the employment policy experience in these countries is
that the collection of labor market support programs was largely adopted as a unified set
rather than in the gradual piece-meal fashion experienced in the economically developed
nations. Furthermore, since Hungary and Poland each operate all labor market programs
through a single agency, the process of client intake and referral to programs is conducted in
a relatively coordinated fashion. The unified nature of active labor programs is further
advanced by the information and management systems developed.

*The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 is formally Public Law 103-62,
approved August 3, 1993.
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To this point in time the transfer of knowledge about employment policy has been
from the mature market economies to the less developed countries. Even the management
systems developed for active labor programs in Hungary and Poland are adapted from
monitoring methods used in nations with developed market economies, but because programs
in Hungary and Poland are operated in a coordinated way the performance indicators systems
provide a simultaneous view of the effectiveness of all programs thereby clearly revealing
policy trade-offs. These management systems are models for other nations in Central and
Eastern Europe, and they may also provide insights for nations with much longer histories of
public employment policy.
In the next section the evolution of labor market conditions in Hungary and Poland
during the transition to market economics is described. Section 3 then provides an overview
of the important features of active labor programs recently implemented to support
development of competitive labor markets. Section 4 summarizes performance measurement
systems introduced in both countries to support decentralized decision making in employment
policy and promote superior performance through positive incentives. The specific
performance indicators used are also listed in Section 4 together with general descriptions of
how these indicators were selected. Section 5 shows how performance indicators depend on
administrative and follow-up data, and describes the computerized management information
systems under development; plans for using the results of performance measurement to
improve program management and planning are also given. Section 6 provides a description
of how demographic data on clients and indicators of conditions in local labor markets may
be used to adjust national standards for local conditions and reduce creaming in program
assignment. The final section provides a summary of how information from the performance
assessment may be used in the annual planning and budget allocation process for employment
programs.
2. Labor Market Conditions in Hungary and Poland
In a population of about 10 million with a labor force nearly half that size, registered
unemployment in Hungary rose from 23,000 in January, 1990 to 705,000 in February, 1993.
Kollo (1993) estimates that during this period a million jobs were lost in Hungary, with part
of the loss (188,000) absorbed by the retirement of workers, while the working age
population grew by over 100,000. He admits some job growth during the period, but also
estimates that nearly a quarter-million dropped out of the labor force. Trends during the
years 1989-93 in the Hungarian labor market and economy are summarized in Table 1.
Since 1993 measured unemployment in Hungary has declined somewhat and as of March
1995 stood at an 11.5 percent national average. LdzaY and Sz£kely (1994) provide evidence
from a survey of unemployment compensation exhaustees that the decline in unemployment is
not associated with excessive increases in inactivity. Unemployment trends in various
regions of Hungary are summarized in Table 2. Unemployment has been highest in the
northeastern mining and metallurgy regions and the agricultural plains of the east which have
lost the important Soviet and Comecon markets.
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Tables 3 and 4 summarize the national and regional trends in unemployment in Poland
as well as some other aspects of national economic activity. Officially measured
unemployment in Poland jumped from zero in 1989 to 16.0 percent in 1993 measured on the
basis of registrations with the employment exchange. Gora (1994) asserts that the process of
rising unemployment in Poland over the 1990-93 period was accompanied by "low outflow
rates that were very low by international standards...At the same time inflow rates were quite
moderate." In particular, Gora has noted that unemployment estimates based on registered
unemployment may be overstated because many persons who are truly inactive only maintain
registration with the placement service so as to keep eligibility for national health insurance.
3. Active Labor Programs (ALPs)
Both Hungary and Poland operate unemployment compensation programs.
Micklewright and Nagy (1994) provide an excellent analysis of the working of the Hungarian
system, and O'Leary and Targowski (1993, p. 12-3) provide an explicit statement of rules
for the Polish system. Unemployment compensation is a passive labor market support
measure. The focus of this paper is active labor programs (ALPs).
Table 5 provides a list comparing ALPs operated in Hungary and Poland. Both
countries operate an employment exchange or placement service, plus retraining, self
employment, and job creation investment programs. Wage subsidies are operated in each,
however, in Hungary the long term unemployed are the target group, while in Poland recent
graduates are the beneficiaries of wage subsidies. Hungary and Poland each operate public
service employment programs; Poland also operates Intervention Works programs which are
shorter in duration and operated by private employers. Hungary also operates work sharing
and early retirement, two programs not available in Poland. Poland is currently considering
instituting a work sharing scheme.
The programs listed in Table 5 are as operated in 1995. Dramatic change is
imminent in Hungary where it is likely that the menu of ALPs will be trimmed to four in
1996: retraining, public service employment, wage subsidies for long term unemployed, and
self-employment assistance. This paper presents the performance measurement systems
developed to support management of the employment programs listed in Table 5. In the
following two subsections a bit more detail about the operation of ALPs in the two countries
is given.2

2In each country the employment exchange operates as a central intake and referral
agency for referral to job listings or ALPs. Detail on the employment exchange or
placement service are not listed separately for each country.
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3.1 ALPs in Hungary
Retraining - Article 14 of the Employment Act of 1991 provides for the possibility of
training for persons who are either unemployed, expected to become unemployed, or
currently involved in public service employment (PSE). Certain provisions are also made for
recent school leavers who are unemployed. The support for training may include a
supplement to earnings or a benefit in lieu of earnings, and reimbursement of direct training
expenses. The amount of benefit in lieu of earnings is equal to 110 percent of the
unemployment compensation otherwise payable.
Self Employment Assistance - Article 15 of the Employment Act of 1991 provides for self
employment assistance for persons who are eligible for unemployment compensation. The
support may amount to 6 monthly payments of unemployment compensation beyond the basic
one year eligibility. Support may also include reimbursement of up to 50 percent of the cost
of professional entrepreneurial counseling services, and 50 percent of the cost of any training
courses required for engaging in the entrepreneurial activity. A little used provision allows
for payment of up to 50 percent of one year's premium on loan insurance for funds borrowed
to start the enterprise.3
Wage Subsidy for Hiring Long Term Unemployed - Article 16 of the Employment Act of
1991 provides for up to a 50 percent wage subsidy for up to one year of total labor costs for
hiring persons unemployed for more than 6 months (3 months for school leavers), provided
the employer has not laid off anyone involved in the same line of work in the previous 6
months and does not lay off anyone during the subsequent 3 months. The wage subsidy
payment is made directly to the employer.
Public Service Employment - Article 16 of the Employment Act of 1991 provides that in the
case of hiring for public works, the wage subsidy may be up to 70 percent provided that no
payment from another agency or under other provisions is available.
Job Creation Investments - Article 17 of the Employment Act of 1991 provides that aid may
be granted to enterprises for undertaking investment projects intended to facilitate the
employment of persons displaced from the labor market continuously.
Part-time Employment (Work Sharing) - Article 18 of the Employment Act of 1991 provides
that in cases where an employer employs all or some of his full-time workers on a part-time
basis in order to avoid layoffs, and hours are reduced by at least one-third of the full
working time, up to 50 percent of the personal basic wages lost due to the hours reduction

3The model now in place with monthly payments is similar to that tested in
Massachusetts, it replaces what was essentially a lump sum grant system in place prior to the
1991 Act which was similar to the model tested in Washington state. For a discussion of the
American experiments see Wandner (1992).
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may be provided to employers who pay their workers for the lost hours of work. Such
payment may be made for up to one year provided the employer does not resort to a layoff,
in which case the amount of any aid granted shall be repaid by the employer.
Early Retirement Subsidy - Article 19 of the Employment Act of 1991 provides that an
employer may apply for payment from the Employment Fund of some of the money payable
by him as a consequence of early retirement of his workers.4 The amount may be up to 50
percent if a considerable layoff was involved and no profit was realized or a loss was made
during the previous year, or 100 percent if the enterprise goes out of existence or is
liquidated without a successor in title. A layoff is deemed considerable if at least 25 percent
of the average staff of the year before or not less than 300 workers are released. Early
retirement pension cost supplements shall be suspended prior to normal retirement age if
gainful employment for wages at least equal to the minimum wage is obtained.
3.2 ALPs in Poland
Placement Service - The .Placement Service was established to help unemployed workers and
enterprises fill job vacancies. The services are provided free of charge to all and are based
on the following principles: (1) available to all, (2) voluntary services, (3) equality of service
to job seekers without regard to nationality, political or social orientation, gender, religion or
other circumstances, (4) openness all vacancies are publicly announced. Under the law,
establishments are obliged to report to the nearest LLO all job vacancies and opportunities
for vocational preparation, but there is no penalty if openings are not reported. LLOs have
the responsibility to register unemployed and job seekers.
To retain eligibility for services of the System of Labor Offices (SOLO), unemployed
persons are obliged to report to a Local Labor Office (LLO) at least once a month, as well
as whenever called by the LLO to confirm their job readiness, to take a job, or to receive
information on opportunities for employment, training, or retraining. The Voivod Labor
Offices (VLOs) and LLOs shall provide vocational guidance, direction to a job, or direction
to training. Medical, psychological, and pedagogic examinations should be administered by
VLOs and LLOs to assess the job readiness of unemployed persons. The costs of these
examinations may not be imposed on the unemployed persons.
Services provided include: (1) registration of unemployed people and job seekers, (2)
keeping records of unemployed and job seekers, (3) providing aptitude testing and vocational
guidance, and (4) soliciting and registering job vacancies.

4The cost of early integration into the national retirement pension system, and an
employers obligation, is covered under a separate act.
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Retraining - If there are no reemployment opportunities in a local area then LLOs may
initiate training or retraining. The LLO should organize retraining particularly when: (1)
there is a lack of any vocational skills among the unemployed, (2) there is a need to change
their qualifications due to the lack of job offers which would match their qualifications and
the state of their health in the local area, or (3) individual unemployed persons have lost the
ability to work in their previous occupation.
A training benefit may be paid to an unemployed person who qualifies for the
unemployment benefit. In any particular case, retraining should not exceed 6 months, and
may not exceed 12 months. The training benefit amounts to 115 percent of the
unemployment benefit. If unemployed persons are not eligible for unemployment
compensation the training benefit is paid by the LLO. If a person quits training before
completing a course of study they must reimburse the costs of training. If such a person is
entitled to the unemployment benefit he/she does not have to reestablish benefit entitlement.
After quitting training, he/she automatically reacquires this entitlement. If a trainee is
otherwise eligible to receive unemployment compensation that person is also entitled to: 1)
family and nursing allowances and death grants, 2) benefits due for job accidents and
occupational diseases, 3) benefits of the health care system. Also, during, periods out of
work, social insurance contributions are made. Benefits are also paid for members of the
family.
Loans to the Unemployed for Small Business Start-up - Local Labor Offices may grant loans
in lump sums to unemployed workers for self employment. The loan may not exceed 20
times average pay. If self employment is continued for 24 months, 50 percent of the loan
amount may be forgiven by the LLO. Loan contracts are made with the LLO at prevailing
interest rates and under rules administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy
(MOLSP). Lists of persons granted loans are public. The administrative procedures issued
in the Order of the Minister of Labor and Social Policy dated December 17, 1991 on the
rules for granting loans from the Labor Fund (Dz. U. No. 122, item 539) require certain
elements in the business plan of the loan applicant, specify the rate of interest for payment on
the loan, set the maximum term of the loan, and require immediate repayment if the agreed
on business plan is not pursued.
Loans to Employers for Job Creation - Local Labor Offices may grant loans to existing
businesses to organize new places for employment. The amount of the loan may not exceed
20 times average pay per new work place created. New work places must be organized for
at least 24 months. Loan contracts are made with the LLO at prevailing interest rates and
under rules administered by the MOLSP. Lists of persons granted loans are public.
The administrative procedures issued as the Order of the Minister of Labor and Social
Policy dated December 17, 1991 on the rules for granting loans from the Labor Fund (Dz.
U. No. 122, item 539) require a loan recipient to have had stable employment levels in
recent years, to have a specific plan for use of the job creation investment loan including a
statement of the exact number of new job places to be created, to pay a specific rate of
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interest on the loan, to repay the loan within a certain number of months, and to immediately
repay the loan if the agreed on job creation investment is not pursued.
Public Works - Upon application of the organizer of a public works project, the pay and the
social insurance premium for an unemployed person sent by a LLO and employed in a public
works project are covered from the Labor Fund up to 75 percent of the average pay for each
person sent and employed. Public works may be operated by municipal (gmina) authorities
or by local representatives of national government administration. The Ministry of Labor
and Social Policy has set forth the following general principles for organizing Public Works
projects: (1) Public Works projects should be infrastructure investments like roads, forestry,
communication and so forth, (2) Public Works projects should not compete with any existing
business, (3) Public Works projects should recruit workers through the Local Labor Offices
(LLOs), (4) proposals for Public Works projects should be sent by LLOs and VLOs to their
employment councils for review, finally (6) contracts for Public Works projects must state
the number of persons to be employed, the type of work to be done, the dates of work, the
funding arrangements, and the LLOs who will refer workers. While not a requirement of
the Act, it is a practice of the Ministry to give priority for Public Works projects to those
areas with the highest unemployment rates. Indeed, the amount of funds allocated to projects
in an area from the Labor Fund increases with the level of unemployment in the area.
Intervention Works - "A Local Labor Office reimburses to the employer part of his expenses
connected with hiring an unemployed person within an intervention works project up to the
amount of the unemployment benefit that person is entitled to, including the social insurance
premium, for a period of six (6) months."5 The maximum length of an intervention works
project is 6 months. The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy has set forth the following
general principles for organizing Intervention Works projects: (1) Intervention Works
projects may not compete with any companies, (2) Intervention Works may be undertaken
only by companies which during the most recent 6 months did not lay off more than 10
percent of their workers, (3) Intervention Works projects may not be organized by political
parties, trade unions, government agencies, churches, or foreign states (4) Intervention
Works projects should recruit workers through the Local Labor Offices (LLOs), and (5)
contracts for Intervention Works projects must state the number of persons to be employed,
the type of work to be done, the dates of work, the funding arrangements, and the LLOs
which will refer workers.
Wage Subsidies for Hiring Recent Graduates - Establishments that hire unemployed recent
graduates are exempt from paying a tax contribution to the Labor Fund on wages paid to
their employees for up to 9 months.6 Furthermore, a LLO may pay to the hiring

5From Article 17 of the Act.
6For recent graduates, the effective maximum duration of unemployment compensation
entitlement is nine (9) months. A person who registers as unemployed immediately upon
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establishment an amount equal to the unemployment compensation and social insurance
contribution which the LLO would have disbursed had the person been unemployed. This
payment can be made for a period for which a graduate could collect the benefit if the
graduate is to be employed in this firm for longer than 12 months.
4. Performance Measurement Systems for Active Labor Programs
Management information systems are being developed in both Hungary and Poland to
support decentralized decision making in employment policy and promote superior
performance through positive incentives. These systems provide more than simply
computerization of existing functions. The systems will informate rather than simply
automate activities of all professionals within the employment program organizations from
employment specialists to top managers. The systems organize information on several
characteristics of persons seeking work, employers seeking workers, employment services
available, and active labor program service providers. For managers, the system presents
information combined from financial and follow-up records to provide information critical to
decisions about allocation of resources.7
The foundation of the management information system is the monitoring of active
labor programs effectiveness. The system focuses on timely measures which can be readily
implemented and will become a natural tool for managers. The process centers on what are
called performance indicators (PI). These measures will allow establishment of baseline
performance targets. This section overviews the principles behind the approach of
performance measurement, describes how the systems for use by management were
developed, and lists the specific performance indicators selected.
To develop good PI the goals of active labor programs must be clearly understood.
Depending on employment policy goals within a particular region, certain of the PI will be
more important than others. The underlying aim of all active labor programs is to get
program participants employed in regular non-subsidized jobs.
Performance indicators are a widely accepted method for managing public programs.
Green and Aaronson (1992) discuss how PI are used in managing training and education

graduation, becomes eligible for compensation after three months if all attempts to find
employment fail. Such a recent graduate then loses entitlement twelve (12) months after
leaving school.
7In a fully evolved system, the traditional job matching function carried out by a clerk
with a file cabinet, is improved in the informated environment by allowing the system to prescreen available options and present a list to the employment specialist of the most promising
alternatives ranked by likely success given the characteristics of the client.
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programs in 39 programs which are administered by 7 departments of the U.S. federal
government. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) provide documentation of innumerable cases
where PI are used by state and local governmental units in the U.S. Extensive systems of PI
are also used in England and Sweden for labor market programs.
Naturally, performance indicators (PI) should be set to guide program operations
toward the goals of the programs, but the most fundamental principle governing the
development of performance indicators is that outcomes rather than process is emphasized.
This is particularly important to bear in mind when instituting such a system within
government agencies where planning and building of organizations was up until recently the
main objective.
Particularly during the early phase of implementation it is important that the system for
monitoring cost effectiveness of active labor programs not impose an excessive administrative
burden on county and local employment centers where the first priority must be service to
clients. The list of PI should be relatively short for any particular program, and the
associated follow-up surveys should ask the minimum possible number of questions. By
limiting performance measurement to a small number of indicators, the follow-up surveys
may also remain simple. This will increase the reliability of data gathered, increase the
response rate, and increase the likelihood that the system will survive over time thereby
yielding valuable information on how programs perform over time.
A basic objective of evaluating active labor programs is to compare their relative cost
effectiveness. Indeed many of the PI to be used are cost-effectiveness measures in the sense
of Garber and Phelps (1992). They are all constructed so as to measure output per unit
input. The ultimate success of any active labor program occurs when a program participant
either gains regular employment or avoids unemployment with the assistance provided. The
average expenditure to achieve this result is the basic measure for comparing effectiveness
across programs. It is anticipated that results of monitoring the PI will feed directly into the
planning process and help determine the budget allocation. This is part of the process which
may result in an optimal mix of programs. Since the regions vary in their industrial mix and
economic strength and the programs vary in their duration and scale most PI proposed are
stated in relative terms. The sole exception are PI for earnings. 8
In specifying PI for active labor programs it is important that the intermediate goals
which result from the PI are consistent with the broad objectives of securing appropriate
regular employment and maintaining adequate income support. High performance as
measured by the PI should not have unintended negative side effects. The issue of incentive

Performance indicators of earnings have been deleted from the implementation in
Hungary based on the judgement that survey response rates would be too low with sensitive
earnings questions included, and the claim that in Hungary as in other European countries
wage dispersion within occupations is small.
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compatibility of PI with larger aims has received quite extensive attention in the research
literature; important papers are: Barnow (1992), Dickinson et al. (1988), and Singer (1986).
4.1 A Hierarchy of Goals for Labor Market Programs
To give a systematic overview of the goals of labor market programs and to guide the
specification of PI which support these goals, Figure 2 is provided below. The left hand side
of Figure 2 is presented as a pyramid to reflect the fact that there is a hierarchy in the goals
for labor market programs. The right hand side of Figure 2 gives a translation of the three
levels in the pyramid into categories of PI.
The over-riding goal of the collection of labor market programs is to achieve
reemployment of unemployed persons. This goal is represented at the top of the pyramid in
Figure 2. Two categories of performance indicator measure the success in achieving this
goal: r - rate of reemployment, and c - cost of reemployment. The second level in the
pyramid summarizes the goal of providing transitional services which ease the transition from
unemployment to reemployment. The category of performance indicator measuring cost of
achieving this goal is: s - support cost. In the pyramid of Figure 2 the bottom category, or
foundation of the pyramid, is the variety, of program specific goals, PI for this category are
labeled p - program specific goals. This is the foundation of the pyramid because it is the
diversity in the array of programs which supports having a collection. The diversity is
necessary because it is impossible to serve all needs with a single program.
Another part of the strategy in developing PI is to specify them so that comparisons
across programs are possible. Certain of the PI across programs should be similar enough to
allow this. The most comparable measure across programs falls under the category cost of
reemployment, c. In the PI this is usually based on measurement of employment at followup. All programs, except Early Retirement, have a measure of the program cost of
reemployment. Other categories of PI such as the rate of reemployment, r, and the support
cost, s, also allow for comparison across programs, but the PI formulae for measurement
across programs are less similar due to the differences in program design.
4.2 Selecting Performance Indicators in Hungary
There were three major parts of the politics of developing performance indicators (PI)
in Hungary: (1) setting program goals, (2) developing performance indicators of program
goals, and (3) consensus building. While a separate task in itself, the last of these three
influenced the approach to developing the other two.
Reaching agreement on the list of performance indicators took much longer than
planned, however, from the perspective of the long term success of the project the result was
worth the price. The lengthy process resulted in a significant degree of consensus on the
criteria, and a sense of participation and ownership by those who will ultimately use the
system for planning and evaluation.
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While there was some change in the number, type, and rules of the ALPs in Hungary
between 1990 and 1992, many of the goals for ALPs enunciated by the MOL program
directors in 1990 were still applicable for the renewed effort.9 In 1992 the principal goals
stated by representatives of the MOL, the National Labor Center, and the county labor
administrations in the three project pilot counties were: (1) reemployment in regular (not
subsidized) jobs, (2) at good wages. While the adequacy of income replacement is frequently
an issue in the evaluation of passive labor market programs, among ALPs it might be an
important goal only for public service employment.
On Thursday October 22, 1992 a grand meeting was held in Miskolc, Hungary. The
meeting was attended by representatives of all groups who will be working with the PI
system and other advisors. Representatives were from: Ministry of Labor, National Labor
Center, Labor Research Institute of the Ministry of Labor, Somogy County Labor Center,
Hajdu-Bihar County Labor Center, Borsod County Labor Center, and the Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research. Final agreement was reached on the list of PI to be used, and the
means for computing the PI. This list of PI is presented in Table 6.
Subsequent discussion of the PI system continued at the October, 1992 conference
Foglalkoztata's '92-93 in Szeged, Hungary. Where a presentation on the system was given to
county labor program directors and the Director General of the National Labor Center, the
Chief of Audit in the MOL, the Chief of Employment Policy in MOL, a representative from
the Labor Research Institute, and the Deputy Chief of the Training Department in the MOL.
The presentation in Szeged emphasized that work on the system was done in
cooperation with three different counties and that implementation was still more than a year
away so that it would be useful if the other county director generals could offer comment to
help shape the system. The substance of the talk was an overview of the management and
planning system to be implemented and concrete examples of PI on which the system is
based. It was stated that the system would be a management tool to aid counties in
effectively using Employment Fund money. It was emphasized that the system of PI,
management, and planning did not represent a return to the past days of excessive central
planning, but rather that it was an approach to maintain decentralized decision making and
the greatest possible degree of autonomy for county labor administrations. It was argued that
the PI should be viewed as an unobtrusive means for the MOL and the National Labor
Center to monitor activity. The system excludes day to day involvement of the National
Labor Center and MOL in operation of active labor market programs, but allows unobtrusive
monitoring of performance. The system whereby targets for PI will be set on a county by
county basis, which recognizes the relative differences in counties in terms of the severity of
the unemployment problem and the characteristics of the population served by the programs

9The project to revise and implement the PI, planning, and management system began in
May, 1992 and concluded in December, 1993 with national operation beginning January,
1994. For a full description of the system see O'Leary (1994).
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was also explained. In terms of using the PI for management, it was claimed that the
emphasis would be positive reinforcement of good performance and management assistance
where programs could be improved.
The talk at Szeged concluded with an appeal for resources to support development of
the computer software for the planning and evaluation system. Shortly after the meeting a
commitment was made by the National Labor Center to ensure coordination of resources to
produce a software solution.
In October 1993 training was provided in the PI system to representatives of all
counties and Budapest at the resort locations of Balaton Foldvar and Malyi. With the
assistance of computer experts from Borsod county, a working model computer network for
performance measurement was used during the training seminars. These seminars were
followed by nationwide implementation of the follow-up surveys and measurement of
performance via a manual system beginning with programs ended in January 1994.
As seen in the summary matrix of Figure 3, the performance indicators implemented
allowed monitoring of the full hierarchy of program goals. In March 1995 a national
conference about the experience with the PI system was held at the National Labor Center in
Budapest. Wide ranging comments about the system were offered from the counties and
from federal representatives. It was noted that the impending reduction of ALPs to four:
retraining, public service employment, wage subsidies for long term unemployed, and self
employment assistance, will likely simplify the system and speed implementation of the
computerized system.
4.3 Selecting Performance Indicators in Poland
In Poland the system for performance management of active labor programs is being
implemented under World Bank project Terms of Reference 2 (TOR 2). Goals for labor
programs were stated by TOR 2 Advisory and Steering Committees in March of 1993.
These goals are listed in Figure 4. A clear statement of program goals is the first step in
developing a management system which is geared toward achieving outputs rather than
focusing on process. The program performance indicators presented in this report were
selected to be incentive compatible with the goals for programs stated here.
The TOR 2 project team worked to translate these goals in to measurable indicators of
performance. This was done during a fellowship study tour to the United States in May and
June of 1993. The project team included representatives from the voivod labor offices in
Krakow, Poznan, and Bydgoszcz and from the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research. This list was presented to the TOR 2 Advisory and Steering Committees in July
1993 for revision and approval. The list adopted is presented in Table 7. That the PI
selected in Poland span the range of goals for labor market programs is summarized in
Figure 5.
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5. Data, Methods, and Information Systems for Performance Measurement
The data for computing PI is to be collected and organized at the individual person
level. In addition to regional characteristics such as the unemployment rate, individual
records will also include demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education level,
skill level, and information on any special barriers to employment such as recent school
leaver, long term unemployed, or degree of physical handicap. Using this data county
targets for PI can be adjusted to reflect the regional and demographic characteristics of the
population served. This leveling of the playing field is an important aspect of the PI system
for comparing performance across counties and programs. It should also be noted that this
system can be set up to encourage service to the hard to employ by giving extra weight for
service to target groups with specified barriers to employment.
5.1 Data and Computation of Performance Indicators

To provide solid examples of how administrative (A) and follow-up (F) data is combined
to compute PI, statement of the computation formulae for each PI listed in Table 6 for
retraining of unemployed in Hungary is given. Just as in Table 6 the category of
performance measured by the indicator is indicated by a letter after the name of the
indicator. All four categories of performance are measured with the six indicators for
assessing retraining of unemployed. Following the name of each indicator there is a
statement of the rule for computation and some brief comments about special data gathering
considerations. There are two categories of data sources for computing the PI:
administrative records and follow-up surveys. In formulae listed for computation, the source
of data for each concept is indicated by capital letters in parentheses with (A) for
administrative records and (F) for follow-up surveys. Each of the PI are to be computed
using data which covers a single calendar year of program activity. For example, counties
may be required to report by July 1 on activity completed in the previous calendar year.
This should allow sufficient time to complete all follow-up surveys which are to be done 3
months after program completion. This schedule of follow-up is proposed for all
programs. 10
Average cost per course completer employed at follow-up (c)
= [total cost for completed courses (A)] /
[number of course completers employed at follow-up (F)]

10The U.S. Department of Labor Office of Strategic Program and Policy Development
which oversees monitoring of retraining under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) has
concluded that three months is the best time for follow-up since it is short enough to allow a
high response rate among participants, yet long enough to allow sufficient time for
reemployment. Results based on three month follow-up are highly correlated with
reemployment rates measured after one year.
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Figures for this PI should be compiled for each course completed during the previous
year (individual training should be treated as a single course), and averaged over all courses
completed in the previous year. The denominator is the number of trainees who completed
retraining in the previous calendar year who are employed on the follow-up survey date.
Proportion of course completers who are employed at follow-up (r)
= [number of course completers employed at follow-up (F)] /
[number of trainees who successfully finished courses (A)]
This PI is computed as a fraction of all persons who completed training. While some
persons who leave training early may do so to become immediately employed because of a
job offer which may be related to their retraining, the project team in Hungary chose to have
at least on PI focus on course completers.
Average cost per training program entrant (s)
= [total cost for completed courses (A)]/
[number of persons entering training courses (A)]
This PI is computed using data from courses completed during the calendar year. The
data should be compiled around the time of course completion. These figures may be
compiled for each course, or module, completed during the year (individual training should
be treated as a single course), and averaged over all courses completed during the calendar
year.
Proportion of entrants successfully completing retraining (p)
= [number who finish training courses (A)]/
[number who entered training courses (A)]
This PI will be computed for all training completed in each county in the year.
However, with person level data this could also be computed on a course by course (or
module) basis for internal county management purposes. It will be compiled two weeks after
a course ends, after all participants have had at least two chances to pass the final
examination.
Average monthly earnings of course completers working at follow-up (p)
= [sum of average monthly earnings of course completers at follow-up (F)]/
[number of course completers employed at follow-up (F)]
This measure of earnings should be average monthly earnings before bonuses are added
or taxes are deducted. It should be averaged across only those training course completers
who are employed at the time of the follow-up survey. 11

"This PI and all PI relating to earnings have been deleted in Hungary. See footnote 8.
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Proportion of employed course completers working in occupation of training at follow-up (p)
= [number of course completers working in occupation of training (F)]/
[number of course completers employed at follow-up (F)]
Training may or may not provide explicit occupational skills. This measure should be
averaged across only those training course completers who received occupational training,
and are employed at the time of the follow-up survey.
To provide an example, the questions which constitute the follow-up survey for
participants in retraining programs appears as Appendix A to this report. Similar brief
surveys have been developed for each of the active labor programs. 12 While an attempt has
been made to keep the surveys extremely brief so that there will be a high response rate
when they are distributed by mail, the survey for each program also includes a subjective
question or two asking for an opinion about the usefulness of the services provided. These
subjective questions are not directly used in computing PI, but they will provide useful
information about customer reaction to services. 13
Following returns of mail surveys there will be an attempt to contact those who do
not respond by mail. In person contacts of non-responders will be attempted by staff of local
employment centers. Final survey results will be weighted by the reciprocal of the response
rate in an attempt to correct for non-response bias.14 Pilot tests of the mail follow-up
surveys in Hajdu-Bihar county had response rates of about fifty percent. A November 1992
survey of labor market program participants sponsored by the International Labor Office in
Borsod, Hajdu, and Somogy counties which was done in person experienced a response rate
in excess of ninety percent. 15 It is recognized that in person surveys conducted by staff of
the labor organization may elicit biased responses. In the future it is possible that surveys of
labor market program participants will be conducted by third party survey organizations.
5.2 Information Systems to Support Program Management
The computerized information systems under development in Hungary and Poland
each started out to simply support the processing of claims for unemployment benefits and
the registration of unemployed for job search. The local systems were based on personal
12The follow-up surveys and worksheets use to compute the PI in hungary are given in
appendices to O'Leary (1994).
13This type of survey question is recommended as very useful for helping to inform
policy in Chapter 5: "Consumer Driven Government" of Osborne and Gaebler (1992).
14A discussion of the weighting procedure to adjust for survey non-response is given in
Chapter 14 of Hussmanns, Mehran and Verma (1992).
15For a discussion of this survey see Godfrey, Lazar, and O'Leary (1993).
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computers with some local area networks. Information was transported by car or train on
diskette to the national office for central processing.
The information system solution to support nation-wide access to management
summaries was initiated by in house information systems specialists in Hungary, and by
outside international consultants in Poland. In the final stages of system implementation,
native computer experts are assembling the solution in Poland as well.
Figures 6 though 10 provide an overview of how the information systems have
evolved. Figures 6 and 7 summarize the bottom-up approach of Hungary, and Figures 8, 9,
and 10 summarize the top down approach followed in Poland.
Figure 6 identifies 6 active labor programs in Hungary and their computerized support
by 7 information system modules. Each information system (IS) module has two categories
of users: local office and county office. This categorization facilitates the standardization of
software and rapid implmentation. Figure 7 shows the scheme for combining employer data
with person level data to establish an information base for monitoring the performance of
active labor programs.
The Hungarian approach is very practical and simple, however it may produce some
islands of information and a weak integration of information for advanced informatization.
The informatization should be the next step after the Hungarian approach, which automates
most of the clerical functions.
The plan for Poland is more ambitious, it aims to integrate databases and reports of
almost 600 local, voivod, and national level offices simultaneously. The goal is to automate
clerical functions and to informate decision-making by the generation of a concept of the
situation in each active labor program. The solution is based on performance indicators and
management action rules for various ranges of measured performance. Also, this approach
recognizes two areas of computerization: primary area: active labor programs (personemployer-trainer) and secondary area: back office administration of 600 offices.
It is important to note that since the development of the performance management
system began, the staffing at Labor Offices in Poland has grown from 9,000 in 1993 to
13,000 in 1995. If computerization fails, this number may continue to increase.
Furthermore, management decisions will likely be re-active rather than pro-active.
Figure 8 identifies information systems for administrative support of employment
offices in Poland, this operates from one principal database with five main sets of control
programs. Another executive control program integrates program information with back
office information for decision making at either the local, voivod, or national levels of the
system of labor offices. The executive control system includes performance measurement
funcitons.
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Figure 9 shows the architecture of source databases (voivod levels) and repetitive
categories of control programs which should generate scheduled reports and queries. The
minimal solution involves 4 databases and 7 control programs, which will be repeated in
about 560 regional offices. Control programs also will be repeated at regional and national
offices.
Finally, Figure 10 provides a global view of the physical and logical enterprise-wide
computing system.
6. Adjustments for Comparison of Performance
For the following three reasons, an adjustment methodology has been proposed as
part of the system of performance indicators for Hungary and Poland: (1) to assess the
effectiveness of programs in each county considering the specific reemployment difficulties
faced in the county, (2) to reduce creaming when counties work to meet performance
targets16, and (3) to provide incentives for targeting services to certain special groups.
This section provides a description of how demographic data on clients and indicators
of conditions in local labor markets may be used to adjust national standards for local
conditions and to reduce creaming in program assignment. A general methodology for
adjusting the national performance targets to reflect the conditions in the county labor market
is being developed in Hungary and under consideration in Poland. The agency responsible
for program administration may choose to designate certain groups for special attention in
reemployment services (perhaps persons with eight or less years of schooling, persons not
covered by unemployment compensation, the physically handicapped, and long term
unemployed might be targeted for services). If this is done, methods for adjusting the
performance targets by service to these target groups could be incorporated in the adjustment
methodology to provide an incentive for providing service to these groups.
6.1 A Simple Example
Figure 11 is an example of a work sheet which may be used by a Hungarian county
or Polish voivod to adjust the national performance target to determine its own performance

16Creaming refers to the practice of program administrators selecting the most qualified
candidates for program participation so as to increase the likelihood of program success.
The analogy is to milk where the best part, the cream, floats to the top and can be skimmed
off. Creaming is an issue in operating labor market programs because if only the most
qualified people get assistance then the benefit to society of the programs is not as great as it
might be otherwise. Highly qualified program entrants have a good chance of becoming
reemployed even without the services offered in the program, while for less qualified
applicants the program services might be the only realistic path to employment.
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targets for a particular performance indicator. The example given in Figure 11 is for the
Hungarian county Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen for the performance indicator: "cost per training
program completer employed at follow-up."
In Figure 11 the national average performance indicator (PI) value is simply the
unadjusted average of the PI values realized across the nation. The numbers listed under the
heading weights are the amounts by which deviations in county values of PI from national
average PI values change the county performance targets from the national performance
targets for each particular factor. The weights in Figure 11 are based on hypothetical data.
The example given shows a case where it is typical in the nation for a one percent increase
in the percent of training participants who are aged 45 or over to decrease the average cost
per employed trainee at follow-up by HUF 18,210 (monetary units Hungarian Forints).
Increases in the other factors percent of trainees with 8 or fewer years of schooling, percent
of trainees who are recent graduates, and the unemployment rate in the county all tend to
increase the average cost per employed trainee at follow-up.
Since the PI concerns average cost, in this example a lowering of the numerical
performance target is a tightening of the standard, and a raising of the numberical
performance target means the standard is relaxed. In the example, since Borsod county
involved 0.36 percentage points more persons over 45 years of age in their training program
than the national mean, and since that factor tends to decrease costs, the performance target
for Borsod county is lowered by HUF 6,560. Since Borsod county had a larger share of
retraining participants with low educational attainment compared to the national average, and
since increases in that factor tend to increase costs, the Borsod county cost standard will be
slightly relaxed for this factor. For the fourth factor, since the unemployment rate in Borsod
county exceeds the national average by a significant margin, and since a high unemployment
rate tends to raise the average cost per employed trainee at follow-up the performance target
is significantly relaxed for this factor.

6.2 Development of the Adjustment Weights
The weights used in the performance indicators adjustment method work sheet are
simply coefficients from estimation by ordinary least squares (OLS) of a multivariate
regression model of the following type:
(1)

Yi = b0 + b^ + b2x2i + b3x3i + b4x4i + ui}

where, xt to X4 represent the four adjustment factors used to compute the weights which
appear in Figure 11. The four factors are: percent of training participants aged 45 years and
over (xj), the percent of training participants who had 8 or fewer years of formal education
(xj), the percent of training participants who are recent graduates (x3), and the county
unemployment rate in percentage terms fo). Following is the result of estimating equation
(1) on hypothetical data provided by the Borsod County Labor Center for the 20 Hungarian
counties:
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(2)

ys = 152.3 - 18.2xu + O.lx2i + 9.6x3i +
(12.2) (2.8)
(2.3)
(116.6) (17.3)

Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, the coefficient of determination was 0.52. The
F-statistic for joint significance of all parameters estimated of 4.06, indicated that taken
together the parameters are non-zero in a test at the 95 percent confidence level. It is
important to emphasize that the results given in equation (2) and also used in the example of
Figure 11 were estimated using hypothetical data.
6.3 Refinement of the Adjustment Methodology
There are obvious problems with the adjustment methodology as presented. Clearly a
sample size of 20 is too small on which to base such an important management method.
Furthermore, before adjusting the performance targets, the OLS regression parameters will
automatically place half of the counties above the national mean performance targets and the
other half below.
It is being recommended that an adjustment methodology only be attempted after the
first year of data collection which includes gathering of follow-up surveys. From these
surveys large random samples may be taken with the PI being calibrated using micro data. 17
This procedure will involve linking unit costs to programs. In the future as the system
matures, the adjustment factors used will change depending on changes in policy targets, and
the methodology used for computing adjustment weights will be refined. 18
7. Uses of management information
The system of PI described in this paper for active labor programs is quite similar to
that used for the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) programs in the United States.
Laventhol and Horvath (1988), and Ryan and Kauder (1990) are excellent detailed manuals
for managing with a system of performance indicators. The main principles guiding these
methods are summarized in Osborne and Gaebler's (1992) Reinventing Government, the
closely read manual for analysts working on Vice President Al Gore's committee to improve
the efficiency of the American federal government.

17A good discussion of methods for refining performance indicators is given in Richard
W. West (1992), Development of Adjustment Models for PY 92 JTPA Performance
Standards for Titles II-A and III. Menlo Park, CA: Social Policy Research Associates (June).
18A good guide on setting performance indicators was produced by the Office of Strategic
Planning and Policy Development (1989) in the U.S. Department of Labor. It is called a
Guide for Setting JTPA Title II-A and Title III (EDWAA) Performance Standards for PY 89.
The Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Development also funded the report by West
(1992).
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7.1 Incentives: Rewards and Management Assistance
While the planning and evaluation methods developed for active labor programs will
also have many unanticipated uses for management, it is expected that the five principal uses
will be:
(1) To preserve decentralized decision making about allocation of funds to various
programs and service providers.
(2) To promote superior performance by counties, local offices, and service
providers through positive incentives.
(3) To help identify and correct poor performance through technical assistance and/or
sanctions.
(4) To contribute information on performance to the funding allocation process.
(5) To ensure compliance with legal requirements of programs.
The emphasis among these uses is on positive incentives rather than punitive action.
7.2 Summarizing Performance Indicators: Four Examples
Table 8 presents a summary of some results of using PI for three hypothetical
counties A, B, and C~in Hungary. Table 8 lists the percentage deviation from the
regression adjusted performance target for each county. Hypothetical values are included for
all the PI listed Table 6 except for the program Retraining of the Employed. The
presentation in Table 8 provides a convenient way to examine the various dimensions of
performance for each separate program. The table also allows comparison across programs
using PI with similar units of measure. It is possible to use the PI information in a variety
of ways. Relying on the example from Hungary, in this section we briefly review four
possibilities.
Following the guide to PI given by Figure 2, a summary indicator for the PI category
Cost of Reemployment could combine information from six of the separate programs for
which PI are listed in Table 6 to compare overall program performance across counties in
Hungary:
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Average cost per course completer employed at follow-up (c)
Average sum of assistance per person still self employed at follow-up (c)
Subsidy per worker in regular employment at follow-up (c)
Average PSE cost per worker in regular work at follow-up (c)
Average cost of subsidies per new job created (c)
Average cost per job saved (c)

While each of the six measures is slightly different, all of these performance indicators
measure the average cost of final program success: reemployment. Averaging the percentage
deviations from adjusted standards across the six measures yields the following simple
average cost indicators: -4.0 percent for County-A, 17.5 percent for County-B, and -4.3
percent for County-C. It is reasonable to average these cost indicators because the objective
for each cost indicator is to be below the target cost level-a negative deviation. In the
example, counties A and C were in the acceptable range for cost effectiveness while county
B significantly exceeded its cost target.
A natural next step would be to investigate the particular programs which contributed
most to the high average cost for_County B. A problem with this method is that programs
operated at very high average cost for achieving outcomes could be offset by others which
are operated very cost effectively. That is, the summary measure obscures important
program specific performance information.
A natural alternative approach which could directly aid counties making their budget
allocation decisions would be to compute the weighted average cost of alternative programs,
where the weights are the ratio of clients served by that particular program to the total
number of participants in all county employment programs. The result of this computation is
the weighted mean cost across programs. This summary measure can be used to directly
guide the counties in the optimal allocation of their county employment budget across
programs. Reallocating participation to lower cost programs will lower the weighted mean
cost and increase overall cost effectiveness of programs.
A third approach to transforming the quantitative information in the PI system into
qualitative information for management purposes is summarized graphically in Figure 12.
This diagram assumes that the values of PI vary across counties so that there is some
distribution of PI values. Within the distribution for each PI it will be possible to set up
ranges of critical values and allow the computerized management information system to
produce a report suggesting management action based on a county labor center value of a PI.
The example depicted in Figure 12 suggests that PI values close to the national mean value
would indicate performance classified as "normal" with the suggested management action to
provide the average budget increase. PI values in the "success" range would yield X percent
budget increase, while those in the "excellent" range would yield a Y percent budget
increase. PI values in the "Conflict" range would result in an X percent budget decrease,
while a PI value in the "crisis" range would result in management assistance being sent from
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the NLC. This suggestion represents a qualitative approach to budget allocation.
Description of a somewhat more technical and quantitative approach follows.
Drawing again on information from Hungary, a fourth example of how performance
information may inform policy decisions is presented in Table 9. The method here is to
select the cost for achieving reemployment for a particular program and dividing the cost of
other programs through by that cost to clearly expose policy trade-offs. The reference cost
selected for the example given in Table 9 is the average cost of reemployment through group
retraining. 19 Since no adjustment methodology has been performed to account for
differences in economic conditions, the counties are listed randomly in Table 9 with county
names suppressed. Table 9, however, is based on actual performance data collected in
Hungary for the first half of 1994. While the cost of achieving reemployment through group
retraining differs across counties, Table 9 nonetheless clearly reveals the relative cost to the
counties of the different programs.
7.3 Allocation of Funds
In both Hungary and Poland the allocation of money from the federal government to
the provincial and local governments for active labor programs is handled similar ways.
Some money is reserved by the federal government for special projects such as rapid
response to mass layoffs or targeted efforts in high unemployment regions. Another fund for
active labor programs is distributed to the provinces by a formula which depends on a variety
of factors including things like the number of registered unemployed, the number of long
term unemployed, and the number of recent school graduates.20 The provinces (called
counties in Hungary and voivods in Poland) then decide on allocation across active labor
programs within the province.
It has been proposed that one or two summary PI measures of the type suggested
above in Section 7.2 be added to the algorithm for allocation across counties of the
decentralized Employment Fund in Hungary. It was suggested that the performance factors
be assigned a weight no greater than 10 percent. It is imperative that this be done to give
importance to the PI system. If even 10 percent of the budget allocation depends on
measures of program performance, a great positive incentive for efficiency will be created.
To give stability to the planning process, it has also been proposed that the budget allocation
process in each year be based on the previous year's allocation, and that not less than 85
percent of the previous year's allocation be guaranteed, with the selected algorithm used to
distribute only the remainder of the fund. A similar recommenation has been made in
Poland.

19In this example the average cost of reemployment through group retraining is a type of
numeraire.
20An overview of the Hungarian budget allocation model is given in O'Leary (1993).
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7.4 An Overview of the Evaluation and Planning Process
The following is an outline of the evaluation and planning process proposed for
Hungary and Poland. In the outline the regional administrative districts are referred to as
provinces rather than counties or voivods. The management system suggested calls for
establishment of Master Plans which govern practices by the national and provincial
employment organs. Once Master Plans are established they remain relatively unchanged
from year to year. The annual cycle mainly involves Annual Plans and Quarterly Reports.
The system outlined is under close consideration by the Ministry and the National Labor
Center in Hungary; it has not yet received careful review in Poland.
(1)

The Ministry sets general goals for employment programs.

(2)

The Ministry includes their goals in a Master Plan for employment programs.

(3)

The Ministry prepares and distributes Guidelines for Preparing a Province Master
Plan for Employment Programs.

(4)

Provinces state goals and procedures in their Province Master Plan for Employment
Programs.

(5)

Ministry and the National Labor Organization estimate the "Number of job seekers
who actively use the employment exchange" for the planning year for each province.
These estimates are communicated in the Guidelines for Preparing a Province Master
Plan for Employment Programs.

(6)

The Province Annual Plan for Employment Programs summarizes program activity
and achievement of national program performance standards and province program
targets, and describes the management, monitoring, and planning procedures used in
the province. Provinces also include a financial forecast of the cost associated with
planned activities.

(7)

The planing department in the Ministry reviews the annual plans and prepares a
Ministry Annual Plan for Employment Programs which is the basis for the
employment programs budget request from Parliament.

(8)

The Ministry reviews the province performance on the previous year's performance
targets and specifies targets for the coming program year. The Ministry informs the
province about funding available for employment programs in coming year.

(9)

The provinces solicit retraining, PSE, and job creation investment proposals and
prepare for the process of proposal review and project award.

(10)

The provinces submit reports to the Ministry on program activity quarterly.
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8. SUMMARY

This paper describes the context of active labor programs in post-socialist Hungary
and Poland. It then proceeds to review the rules and aims of the active labor programs.
Next the comprehensive and integrated management and planning systems, based on a set of
performance indicators (PI) for these programs, is described. This is followed by
presentation of the PI to be used for monitoring active labor programs together with a
discussion of the politics of selecting and implementing the PI system. Also given is an
explanation of how the PI will be used with administrative and follow-up data and the
automated information system supporting management decisions.
The systems of PI are designed to monitor performance while allowing decentralized
decision making and avoiding adverse incentives. The systems are intended to promote
superior performance through positive incentives, and to help identify and correct poor
performance through technical assistance and/or sanctions. The paper shows how the PI
allow a standardized assessment of program performance across administrative districts. An
example is given which shows how demographic data on clients and indicators of regional
unemployment are used to adjust national standards for local conditions. Finally, the paper
explains how information from the performance assessment may be used in the annual
planning and budget allocation process for active labor programs.
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Appendix A
Example Retraining Follow-up Survey
Course Code Number:
Description of course:
Local Office Number:
Name of Respondent:
Address of Respondent:
Postal Code:
Follow-up Survey for Retraining of the Unemployed

(Survey to be conducted 3 months after conclusion of the training course)
Please, give written answers in the spaces provided, and underline the appropriate answer
where alternatives are offered.
A.

How would you rate the quality of training organized for you by the Labor Center?
1.
2.
3.

B.

excellent
good
fair

4.
5.

poor
very poor

Could you get regular employment after the training?
1.
2.
3.

Yes, I got employed
Yes, I got self-employed
No, I did not get employed

(If you answered c, please skip forward to question H.)
C.

Are you now employed or self-employed?
1.

D.

Yes

2.

No

When did you get your first job after the training course ended?
Year __ Month ____ Day ___
(If first job was self-employment go to question F.)
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Page - 2
E.

Type of employment:
1.
2.

Indefinite term
Fixed term (a definite number of months)

F.

Please describe your job or self-employment enterprise:

G.

On your new job, what is the value of the skills learned in your retraining course?
1.
2.
3.

H.

of little value
worthless

I wanted a job, but there were no vacancies
I wanted a job, but the wages offered were too low
I could not look for a job, because of health problems
I have been enrolled in school full-time
I have been doing military service
Other reason, explain:

If you are not employed and not an entrepreneur, what benefits do you receive?
1.
2.
3.
4.

J.

4.
5.

If you are not currently employed, why are you not employed?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

I.

extremely valuable
very valuable
valuable

Regular unemployment compensation
Unemployment compensation for new labor force members
Unemployment assistance for regular UC exhaustees
Neither 1, 2, nor 3.

Other comments or observations: ___________________________

This survey was completed on: Day: ___ Month: ______ Year:

Signature of respondent
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Table 1
Labor Market and Economic Conditions in Hungary, 1989-94
(figures are in millions unless otherwise indicated)
Year
Population

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

10.398

10.365

10.345

10.324

10.294

10.261

Working Age Population
Armed Forces

6.076
6.064
6.044
6.015
5.977
5.963
______

Civilian Labor Force

5.102

4.962

4.816

4.652

4.497

4.320

Civilian Employment

5.078

4.916

4.589

4.096

3.826

3.752

Agriculture
Mining
Manufacturing
Power-Water
Construction
Trade-Catering
Transport-Communication
Financial Services
Health-Education
Public Administration
Other Services

0.820
0.100
1.408
0.130
0.345
0.691
0.362
1.222

0.770
0.085
1.400
0.127
0.350
0.669
0.305
1.210

0.660
0.073
1.305
0.116
0.310
0.518
0.382
0.660
0.286
0.279

0.458
0.053
1.054
0.108
0.217
0.597
0.346
0.069*
0.548
0.311
0.335

0.349
0.042
0.940
0.105
0.207
0.580
0.336
0.073
0.586
0.298
0.310

0.328
0.039
0.889
0.108
0.201
0.578
0.315
0.073
0.578
0.321
0.322

0.024

0.046

0.227

0.556

0.671

0.568

-

-

0.300

0.340

0.350

0.370

Registered Unemployed
Self Employed

0.5

0.9

4.7

12.0

14.9

13.1

Consumer Price Infl. (%)

17.0

28.9

35.0

23.0

22.5

18.8

Wage Inflation (%)

17.9

28.6

30.0

25.1

22.0

24.7

0.8

-0.2

-3.7

1.7

-0.4

5.0

GDP Constant Prices (%A)

-

-4.0

-10.7

-4.5

-0.9

2.0

Industrial Output (%A)

-

-8.5

-19.1

-9.8

4.0

9.2

Registered Unemp. Rate(%)

Real Wage Growth (%)

Data from Employment Observatory: Central & Eastern Europe, No. 7, May 1995.

Table 2
Regional Unemployment Rates in Hungary, 1989-94

1989

1990

1991

Trans Danubian

0.4

1.1

3.9

10.0

12.5

11.4

Great Plain

0.5

1.0

5.0

12.1

15.4

13.6

North-East

0.8

1.7

7.2

16.2

19.5

17.1

North-West & Budapest

0.2

0.3

2.2

6.7

8.8

7.6

National Average

0.5

0.9

4.7

12.0

14.9

13.1

1992

1993

Data from Employment Observatory: Central & Eastern Europe, No. 7, May 1995.

1994

Table 3
Labor Market and Economic Conditions in Poland, 1989-94
(figures are millions of persons unless otherwise indicated)
1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Population

37.963

38.119

38.245

38.365

38.459

38.544

Working Age Population

23.157

23.278

23.402

23.539

23.693

23.872

0.373

0.347

0.335

0.342

0.354

0.357

Civilian Labor Force

17.002

16.871

17.010

17.032

17.067

17.743

Civilian Employment

17.002

16.280

15.326

14.677

14.330

14.833

Agriculture
Mining
Manufacturing
Power-Water
Construction
Trade-Catering
Transport-Communication
Financial Services
Health-Education
Public Administration

4.557
0.578
4.173
0.182
1.321
1.515
1.222
0.172
1.950
0.195

4.328
0.565
3.947
0.137
1.243
1.626
1.056
0.181
2.002
0.193

4.116
0.459
3.657
0.138
1.065
1.530
0.999
0.179
2.039
0.202

3.839
0.459
3.282
0.142
1.066
1.682
0.968
0.199
1.906
0.229

3.754
0.422
3.040
0.167
0.861
1.997
0.866
0.226
1.881
0.262

3.920
0.394
2.970
0.276
0.839
2.137
0.835
0.241
1.875
0.268

Other Services

1.137

1.002

0.942

0.905

0.854

1.078

Registered Unemployed

0.000

0.591

1.684

2.355

2.737

2.910

Self Employed

4.270

4.424

4.600

4.850

4.641

4.534

0.0

3.5

9.9

13.8

16.0

16.4

Consumer Price Infl. (%)

251.1

585.8

70.3

43.0

35.3

29.5

Wage Inflation (%)

291.8

398.0

70.6

38.8

33.8

34.7

11.6

-27.4

0.2

-2.9

-1.1

1.9

0.2

-11.6

-7.0

2.6

3.8

5.0

-

-24.2

-11.9

3.9

7.3

11.9

Armed Forces

Registered Unemp. Rate(%)

Real Wage Growth (%)
GDP Constant Prices (%A)
Industrial Output (%A)

Data from Employment Observatory: Central & Eastern Europe, No. 7, May 1995.

Table 4
Regional Unemployment Rates in Poland, 1990-94
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

North-East (Polnocno - Wschodni)

9.5

16.4

18.6

22.0

22.2

Central-East (Srodkowo - Wschodni)

6.1

10.9

11.2

13.2

14.7

South-East (Poludniowo - Wschodni)

5.9

11.1

13.0

14.2

14.9

Capital (Stoleczny)

4.3

8.9

10.5

13.5

13.3

Central (Srodkowy)

7.9

14.9

15.9

18.8

18.0

South (Poludniowy)

4.0

8.3

9.7

10.9

11.5

North (Polnocny)

6.4

14.0

17.1

19.6

20.0

Central-West (Srodkowo - Zachodni)

6.7

12.8

14.9

16.9

17.5

South-West (Poludniowo - Zachodni)

7.3

13.9

15.7

18.3

19.1

National Average

3.5

9.9

13.8

16.0

16.4

Year

Data from Employment Observatory: Central & Eastern Europe, No. 7, May 1995.

Table 5
Active Labor Programs in Hungary and Poland
Active Labor Program

Hungary

Poland

Placement Service

Yes

Yes

Retraining

Yes

Yes

Self Employment Assistance

Yes

Yes

Wage Subsidy for Hiring

Long Term Unemployed

Recent Graduates

Public Service Employment1

Yes

Yes

Job Creation Investments

Yes

Yes

Work Sharing

Yes

No

Early Retirement Subsidy

Yes

No

Poland also has Intervention Works projects operated by private sector employers.

Table 6
Performance Indicators for Active Labor Programs in Hungary
1. Retraining (Article 14)
Retraining of Unemployed
Average cost per course completer employed at follow-up (c)
Proportion of course completers who are employed at follow-up (r)
Average cost per training program entrant (s)
Proportion of entrants who successfully complete training courses (p)
Average monthly earnings of course completers employed at follow-up (p)
Proportion of employed course completers working in occupation of training at follow-up (p)
Retraining of Employed
Average cost per course completer employed at follow-up (c)
Average cost per course completer still employed at firm of training at follow-up (c)
Proportion of course completers who are employed at follow-up (r)
Proportion of course completers still employed at firm of training at follow-up (r)
Average cost per training program entrant (s)
Proportion of entrants who complete training courses (p)
Average monthly earnings of course completers employed at follow-up (p)
Proportion of course completers working in occupation of training
at follow-up (p)
2. Self Employment (Article 15)
Average sum of assistance per person still self-employed at follow-up (c)
Proportion of persons still self employed at follow-up (r)
Average subsidy per subsidized self-employed (s)
Average added employment resulting from self employment assistance at follow-up (p)
3. Wage Subsidy for Hiring Long Term Unemployed (Article 16)
Subsidy per worker in regular employment at follow-up (c)
Proportion of subsidized workers who are in regular employment at follow-up (r)
Average monthly cost of wage subsidy per subsidized employee (s)
Average duration of subsidy per subsidized employee (p)

23

Table 6 Continued
4. Public Service Employment (Article 17)
Average PSE cost per worker in regular work at program exit (c)
Proportion of PSE workers in regular work at program exit (r)
Average monthly cost per PSE worker (s)
Average monthly earnings of PSE workers in regular work at program exit (p)
Average duration of PSE employment for program leavers (p)
Average duration of PSE employment for program leavers who gain regular employment (p)
5. Job Creation Investments (Article 17)
Average cost of subsidies per new job created (c)
Proportion of placements still employed at follow-up (r)
Among jobs promised the proportion actually created (p)
Among jobs created the proportion filled by persons from target groups (p)
6. Part-time Employment (Work Sharing) (Article 18)
Average cost per job saved (c)
Proportion of jobs at risk which are saved (r)
Average cost per job at risk (s)
Average number of months employees are subsidized (p)
7. Early Retirement Subsidy (Article 19)
Average cost per person entering early retirement (s)
Average monthly early retirement subsidy per person (s)
Employment fund share of early retirement commitments made in the calendar year (p)
Average months until regular retirement (p)
8. Employment Exchange (Article 47-53)
Average
Average
Average
Average
Average

number of referrals per job placement (r)
number of days until reemployment (p)
cost per employment exchange visit (p)
cost per employment exchange registrant (p)
number of days until vacancies are filled (p)
24

Table 7
Performance Indicators for Labor Programs in Poland
A.

Unemployment Compensation

A. 1
A.2
A.3
A.4
A.5

Administrative cost per recipient (p)
Average compensation for a month unemployed (s)
Average duration as a proportion of entitled duration (d)
Average days receiving unemployment compensation (p)
Average earnings replacement rate (p)

B.

Placement Service

B. 1
B.2
B.3
B.4
B.5

Referrals per person reemployed (r)
Average cost of finding reemployment for one person (c)
Average cost per employment exchange visit (p)
Average number of days until a vacancy is filled (p)
Average cost of gaining one new job vacancy listing (p)

C.

Retraining

C.I
C.2
C.3
C.4
C.5
C.6

Proportion of course completers employed at follow-up (r)
Average cost per course completer employed at follow-up (r)
Average cost per training program entrant (s)
Proportion of entrants completing training course (p)
Average monthly earnings of course completers working at follow-up (p)
Proportion of employed course completers working in occupation of training at
follow-up (p)
Proportion of course completers still employed at firm of training at follow-up (for
retraining of employed) (p)
Average cost per course completer still employed at firm of training at follow-up (for
retraining of employed) (p)

C.I
C.8

D.

Small Business (Loans to the Unemployed for Start-up)

D.I
D.2
D.3
D.4
D.5
D.6

Proportion of persons still self-employed at follow-up (r)
Amount of money granted per person still self-employed at follow-up (c)
Average amount of money granted per loan (s)
Proportion of the maximum allowable amount of money given on the average loan (p)
Loan repayments received as a proportion loans given (p)
Additional persons hired per person still self-employed at follow-up (p)

Table 7 continued
E.

Job Creation (Loans to Employers)

E. 1
E.2
E.3
E.4
E.5
E.6

Proportion of persons still employed at follow-up (r)
Loan amount per person employed at follow-up (c)
Average loan amount per new job place (s)
Average loan as a fraction of maximum allowable amount (p)
Loan repayments received as a proportion loans given (p)
Proportion of promised new job places actually created (p)

F.

Public Works

F. 1
F.2
F.3
F.4
F.5
F.6

Proportion of workers gaining regular employment (r)
Cost of subsidy per employee gaining regular employment (c)
Average cost of subsidy per employee (s)
Proportion of unemployed refusing to take part (p)
Proportion of maximum allowable amount of money spent on the average public
works project (p)
Fraction renewing eligibility for unemployment benefit (p)

G.

Intervention Works

G. 1
G.2
G.3
G.4
G.5
G.6

Proportion of workers gaining regular employment (r)
Cost of subsidy per employee gaining regular employment (c)
Average cost of subsidy per employee (s)
Proportion of unemployed refusing to take part (p)
Proportion of maximum allowable money spent on the average intervention works
project (p)
Fraction renewing eligibility for unemployment benefit (p)

H.

Graduates Subsidies (Wages for recent graduates)

H. 1
H.2
H.3
H.4
H.5
H.6
H.7

Proportion of participants in regular jobs at follow-up (r)
Cost per participant in regular job at follow-up (c)
Average monthly cost of wage subsidy (s)
Average duration of subsidy as a proportion of maximum allowable duration (p)
Proportion of all registered unemployed graduates participating in the program (p)
Average monthly wage subsidy as a proportion of maximum allowable cost (p)
Average duration of subsidy per subsidized employee (p)

Table 8:

Percentage deviation of actual values of county performance indicators
from the adjusted standards

Performance Indicators

Measurement County-A

Counry-B

County-C

1. Retraining
%
%
%
%
%
%

-17.0
7.7
-10.1
1.6
4.0
5.4

-8.8
-12.2
-13.4

3.8
4.1
-4.2

-3.6
2.1
4.5
0.3
2.9
-2.9

%
%
%
%

-9.5
12.2
1.3
-30.4

12.3
-22.9
-10.8
20.9

-9.6
13.4
7.3
-38.5

Subsidy per worker in reg. employ at follow-up (c)
%
Prop subsidized wkrs in reg emp at follow-up (r)
%
Avg mo cost-wage subsidy per subsidized employee (s) %
Avg duration-subsidy per subsidized employee (p)
%

-1.9
20.9
1.4
7.1

60.6
-31.1
2.7
-3.7

202
-12.8
-6.0
12.6

%
%
%
%
%
%

-2.9
25.9
0.8
-2.6
-10.4
-1.1

0.4
1.7
8.8
10.6
9.4
-15.8

-23.7
8.3
-73
-14.4
-9.6
-12.8

%
%
%
%

-6.9
4.0
-1.6
-13.2

-9.1
0.2
3.1
9.6

16.9
2.6
-13.3
'8.3

%
%
%
%

14.2
-20.9
8.1
-13.5

49.6
-38.3
9.3
-4.2

-26.1
-2.8
-20.1
33.7

%
%
%
%

-4.7
-3.3
1.6
2.2

3.5
1.3
-1.5
-1.0

12.9
6.7
7.2
10.7

%
%
%
%
%

-9.4
4.5
2.0
-6.9
-0.5

-13.3
-6.3
-0.2
10.4
9.4

-13.4
-0.6
-3.2

Avg cost per course comp. (cc) emp at follow-up (c)
Prop of cc who are employed at follow-up (r)
Avg cost per training program entrant (s)
Proportion of entrants who complete training (p)
Avg mo. earnings cc employed at folow-up (p)
Prop of emp cc wrk in occ. of trn at follow-up (p)

2. Self-employment
Avg sum-assist per pers self-emp at follow-up (c)
Prop, of persons still self-employed at follow-up (r)
Average subsidy per subsidized self-employed (s)
Avg added employ from self-emp asst at follow-up (p)
3. Wage subsidy for hiring long-term unemployed

4. Public service employment
Avg pse cost per worker in reg work at prgm exit (c)
Prop pse workers in reg work at prgm exit (r)
Avg monthly cost per pse worker (s)
Avg mo earn of pse wrkrs in reg work-prgm exit (p)
Avg duration pse employment for program leavers (p)
Avg dur. pse employment for prgm Ivrs in reg wrk (p)

5. Job creation investments
Average cost-subsidies per new job created (c)
Prop of placements still employed at follow-up (r)
Among jobs promised-prop actually created (p)
Among job created-prop fill by prsn frm trgt grp (p)
6. Work sharing
Average cost per job saved (c)
Proportion of jobs at risk which are saved (r)
Average cost per job at risk (s)
Avg number of months employees are subsidized (p)
7. Early retirement subsidy
Avg cost per pers entering early retirement (s)
Avg monthly early retire subsidy per person (s)
Employ fund share-early retire commit in cal yr (p)
Average months until regular retirement (p)
8. Employment exchange
Average
Average
Average
Average
Average

number of referrals per job placement (r)
number of days until reemployment (p)
cost per employment exchange visit (p)
cost per employment exchange registrant (p)
number of days until vacancies are filled (p)

-25
-3.3

Table 9
Relative Cost of Reemployment for Various
Active Labor Programs by County in Hungary
First Half of 1994
Train
Group
County A
County B
County C
County D
County E
County F
County G
County_H
County I
County J
County K
County L
County M
County N
County O
County P
County Q
County R
County S
County T

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Train
Indiv
0.17
1.87
0.15
1.46
0.31
0.47
0.21
0.00
0.18
0.20
0.10
0.18
0.13
0.12
0.55
0.25
0.20
0.18
0.00
0.36

Self Wage
Empl
Sub
0.34
0.33
0.49
0.38
0.24
0.27
0.29
0.15
0.17
0.32
0.13
0.28
0.23
0.32
0.35
0.59
0.28
0.28
0.35
0.19

0.66
1.82
0.83
0.31
2.80
0.00
0.93
0.16
0.53
0.56
0.30
0.70
0.56
0.69
0.51
1.15
0.45
0.46
1.74
0.46

PSE
Month
0.07
0.14
0.12
0.07
0.11
0.07
0.06
0.03
0.05
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.09
0.07
0.11
0.06
0.06
0.12
0.05

JCI
1.20
3.33
4.96
0.74
1.76
1.57
0.00
0.70
0.69
1.68
1.16
1.04
1.26
1.12
1.96
1.87
1.14
1.17
1.23
0.00

Work
Share
0.31
0.00
0.16
0.09
0.43
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.09
0.62
0.00
0.03
0.00
0.26
0.00
0.00
0.13
0.19
0.00
0.14

Early
Retire
0.00
7.25
3.96
2.80
2.73
3.64
0.00
2.05
1.76
2.36
2.20
5.90
3.81
2.87
3.53
0.41
0.00
4.92
5.76
3.70

The columns report program average costs relative to average group retraining costs for:
group retraining, individual retraining, self employment, wage subsidies, public service
employment (PSE) average monthly stipend, job creation investments, work sharing, and
early retirement.
Data from follow-up surveys in all counties for programs completed in the first half of 1994.
Costs listed are for reemployment except for PSE and early retirement. For these programs
the costs listed are the average stipend per month of PSE work, and average total costs for
an early retirement.
For anonymity counties are listed randomly.

Figure 1

Registered Unemployment Rate
Hungary and Poland, 1989-94
Rate of Unemployment (%)

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Year
Hungary — 0.5 0.9 4.7 12.0 14.9 13.1
Poland — 0.0 3.5 9.9 13.8 16.0 16.4

Figure 2
Hierarchy of Goals for Active Labor Programs
Guided by Performance Indicators

c - Cost of Reemployment
Promote
Reemployment
Provide
Transitional
Services

A Variety of Other
Program Specific Goals

r - Rate of Reemployment
s - Support Cost

p - Program Specific Goals

Figure 3
Classification of Performance Indicators
for Active Labor Programs in Hungary

Categories
c

r

s

p

1. Retraining

X

X

X

X

2. Self Employment

X

X

X

X

3. Subsidy for Long Term Unemployed

X

X

X

X

4. Public Service Employment

X

X

X

X

5. Job Creation Investments

X

X

6. Part-time Employment

X

X

Program Name

7. Early Retirement
8. Employment Exchange
Categories of Performance

c - Cost of Reemployment
r - Rate of Reemployment
s - Support Cost
p - Program Specific Goals

X

X
X

X

X

X
X

Figure 4
Goals for Labor Programs in Poland
Stated by the TOR 2 Advisory and Steering Committees
Unemployment Compensation/Unemployment Insurance:
temporary benefits for jobless persons,
motivating beneficiaries for reemployment.
Placement Service:
finding appropriate reemployment for job seekers,
motivating registrants to search for jobs,
maintaining a steady supply of job vacancy listings.
Retraining:
providing professional skills to persons having no profession,
over the long-term, to adjust the skill structure of labor resources to the
changing needs of the economy.
getting trainees reemployed.
Loans to the Unemployed for Small Business Start-up:
promoting development of small business,
enabling the unemployed to gain reemployment through self employment,
creation of new jobs,
relieving the Labor Fund from payment of unemployment compensation.
Loans Employers for Job Creation:
promoting reemployment through creation of new jobs,
supporting the expansion of local businesses,
fostering privileged economic sectors (branches),
relieving the Labor Fund from payment of unemployment compensation.
Public and Intervention Works:
reducing long-term unemployment,
developing local infrastructure to support creation of new jobs,
providing workers with new skills,
promoting reemployment by ensuring readiness to start work.
creating the opportunity for permanent employment,
supporting the development of local businesses,
fostering privileged economic sectors (branches),
Wage Subsidies for Hiring Recent Graduates:
facilitating employment of recent graduates,
supporting the acquisition of practical job skills by graduates thereby
increasing their chances of finding permanent employment.

Figure 5
Classification of Performance Indicators
for Active Labor Programs in Poland

Categories
Program Name

c

r

A. Unemployment Compensation

s

p

X

X

B. Placement Service

X

X

C. Retraining

X

X

X

X

D. Self-employment

X

X

X

X

E. Job Creation Investments

X

X

F. Public Works

X

X

X

X

G. Intervention Works

X

X

X

X

H. Wage Subsidies for Graduates

X

X

X

X

Categories of Performance
c - Cost of Reemployment
r - Rate of Reemployment
s - Support Cost
p - Program Specific Goals

X

X

,',v

i i M-."$Earlyi, ,- - <$

Contribution"

Employers
Request.
Decision.
Contract

Employers
Request.
Decision.
Contract

Employer's
Request.
Decision.
Contract

Attempt on
Placement f L
Service

Reg Pensiorj R
Notice. Mailin
Benefit. I R

ji

Efficiency

Interruptions^^
Termination

( L ) Local Office Function

Figure 6
R j Regional Function

Service Hlocks of the IT System of (he Kmploymcnt Rind
(Su<^cstion on Dividing Inunctions)

Source: Labor Market Information and Analysis Department,
Hungarian National Labor Center.

Employer's
Application.
Decision.
Contract

Employer Data

Employer Data

Person Data

WS

WS

Active Measures

Work Sharing

ER

Figure 7

Information System
for Monitoring
ALPs in Hungary

ER

Early Retirement

Independent
of
Employment
Program

PSE

WS

PSE

WS

Public Service
Employment

Wage Subsidy

Job Creation
Investments
EE Register

Employment
Exchange(EE)
Register

Job Creation
Investments
Not Unemployed

Self Employed

Retraining
Program
Operator
Data

Retraining
Employed

Retraining
Unemployed

Source: Labor Market Information and Analysis Department,
Hungarian National Labor Center.

Retraining
Referral
System

t
j

Executive Information System (EIS)

ission Database MDB

Program-oriented
MIS(s)

Objectives Book System
Executive Data Cube
Position Control System
^ Alert Information System^

irecting
Control DCS
System

Directing
Database
(DDB)

uman R
Control HCS
stem
Budget
Control BCS
System
ccountmg
Control A
stem
nstltutional
Statlsctlc ICS
CS

Placement
Database
(PDB)
Electronic
Mail
Directory

Bulletin
Boards BBS
System
End
User
omputin
Records
Management
System

Figure 8: The Architecture of Administration Oriented MISs
(Q - query, R - reports)

Source: O'Leary and Targowski (1994), Figure IIJ-5.

Program
Statistics
Database
(PSB)

Legal
Control LCS
System

Service
Database

(SDB)

Mission
Database
(MDB)

Control
stem

Fund
Control PCS
System

Operations

Reports &
Statistics

Program
Control PCS
System

Database
(ODB)

Reports &
Statistics

Training
Control TCS
System
Reports &
Statistics

Directing
Database
(DDB)

Complaints
Database
(CDB)

Administration
MISs

Placement
Database
(PDB)

Information

omplalnts
Control CCS
System
Job
Control
System

mission critical flow of Information
1

Payment

Training
Offer

Figure 9: The Architecture of Program-oriented MISs

Source: O'Leary and Targowski (1994), Figure III-4.
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Figure 10: The Architecture of the Labor Office Network Matrix

Source: O'Leary and Targowski (1994), Figure V-4.
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Figure 11
Sample Performance Indicators Adjustment Worksheet

PERFORMANCE INDICATORS WORKSHEET

A. COUNTY NAME

B. COUNTY
NUMBER

Borsod- Abauj -Zemplen
#5
C. PERFORMANCE PERIOD
Calendar Year 1992

D. DATE CALCULATED
6/15/93

E. PERFORMANCE INDICATOR
Average Cost Per Training Course Completer Employed Follow-Up

F. COUNTY FACTORS

G. COUNTY FACTOR VALUES

1. % AGE 45+ (RT14)

4.9

4.54

0.36

2. % SCHOOL < 8 (RT15)

25.4

19.16

6.24

3. % NEW GRADS (RT16)

7.3

8.35

-1.05

9.60

-10.07

4. % UNEMP RATE (III)

17.9

12.17

5.74

8.59

49.28

H. NATIONAL AVERAGES

I. DIFFERENCE
(G minus H)

J. WEIGHTS

-18.21
.139

L. TOTAL

K. EFFECT OF
COUNTY FACTORS
ON PERFORMANCE
INDICATORS
(I times J)
-6.55
0.87

33.53

M. NATIONAL AVERAGE PERFORMANCE INDICATOR

256.85

N. MODEL-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE INDICATOR (L + M)

290.38

0. ACTUAL PERFORMANCE LEVEL

241.1

P. % DEVIATION OF ACTUAL FROM MODEL ADJUSTED
PERFORMANCE LEVEL ((0-N)/N)*100)

-16.97

Figure 12
Management Response to Performance Indicator Values
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